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Abstract 
The present paper is the first to simultaneously include rules and parameters that try to 
parallel the EU ETS in the laboratory. To study the adequacy of the institution chosen 
for the EU ETS is our goal as well as testing the impact of changing the initial 
allocation rule: auctioning instead of grandfathering, in two different experimental 
treatments.  
The use of auctions as a rule for the initial allocation method for CO2 emission permits, 
in the next stages of the EU ETS (European Union Emissions Trading Scheme) is a 
subject the European Commission and its Member-States are currently discussing and 
evaluating. This paper is the first to experimentally test the Ausubel (2004) auction for 
the case of CO2 emission permits in the EU ETS, a theoretically efficient dynamic 
design for multiple units with results equivalent to the Vickrey auction.  
Our experimental results suggest that the Ausubel auction does not allocate CO2 
emission permits efficiently but at the end total abatement cost minimization is still 
achieved in the auctioning treatment. The importance of the secondary market, and its 
functioning rules, is highlighted in this experimental treatment. Moreover, we conclude 
efficiency is the same whether emission permits are initially auctioned or grandfathered. 
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1. Introduction 
Greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions with anthropogenic causes are nowadays 
recognized as the main cause for the global warming problem. Even if controversy 
exists about its true dimension, consequences or human capacity of adaptation, GHG 
reduction is on the political agenda of all world leaders. The 15th Conference of Parties 
(COP15) in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
- Climate Conference in Copenhagen, December 2009 - gathered governmental 
representatives from about 170 countries and a post-Kyoto Protocol was expected to be 
signed at the end. However, that did not happen and only an Accord was signed, which 
means there is not a compromise for the period post-2012 concerning GHG emissions’ 
reductions. COP16 at Mexico City will inevitably include long additional negotiations 
in order to bring the parts into a consensual compromise. 
Even if international diplomacy results’ for GHG emissions’ reductions are still 
uncertain, the European Union has stepped forward in its compromises by defining on 
its Climate Policy the goal to reduce greenhouse gases at least 20% by 2020 compared 
with 1990 levels. The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) it is a 
major policy initiative to achieve that compromise on what concerns CO2 emissions. 
This political choice to fight a global negative externality is on the same line as the 
Kyoto Protocol flexible mechanisms, which included an international market for GHG 
transaction, as well as the more recent RGGI – Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, for 
10 states of the US. 1 Since the decades of 1980/1990 emission permit markets have 
been used for local pollutants like SO2 (sulphur dioxide), mainly in the US and Canada, 
but its application for a global pollutant, like CO2, has an innovative character. For that 
reason and also because the EU ETS dimension and complexity was considerably 
different from previous markets  - due to its multi- jurisdictional political structure, 
connection between differing domestic emissions permits programs, etc. – we focused 
into this specific application of emission permits markets (EPM).  
From the many studies existent about the EU ETS a consensual point can be 
highlighted:  the importance of the institutional rules adopted for its performance, as for 
                                                            
1 Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Rhode Island, Vermont. 
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any other EPM. Particularly, the initial allocation rule decided under the 2003/87/EC 
Directive, recurrently appears as one of least positive aspects of the institution chosen to 
implement the EU ETS. In fact, auctioning instead of grandfathering is presently 
recommended inside the EU for the third phase of the market (starting 2013), as we can 
find in the COM(2008) 16 final from 23.1.2008. Our study intends to contribute to the 
ongoing discussion concerning the use of auctions as a rule for the initial allocation 
method for CO2 emission permits in the next stages of the EU ETS. Under Dales (1968) 
and Montgomery (1972) original model for EPM the initial allocation rule does not 
affect the policy instrument efficiency (it matters only on equity terms). Their results, 
however, suppose a perfectly competitive market and in the EU ETS this is not the case. 
Therefore, we decided to investigate the performance of an EPM similar to the EU ETS 
under alternative allocation rules: grandfathering and auctioning.  
To achieve our goal we selected the experimental methodology, widely used for 
emission permit markets, with purposes similar to ours, for the American and Canadian 
markets: works by Godby et al. (1997), Cronshaw and Brown-Kruse (1999), Franciosi 
et al. (1999), Cason et al. (1999), Mestelman et al. (1999) and Gangadharan et al. 
(2005) are just a few. Surprisingly, for the EU ETS this was not the case. To our 
knowledge, the present work is the first experiment to include both the rules and the 
parameters that parallels the EU ETS structure. Benz and Ehrhart (2007) experimental 
study on the initial allocation of CO2 allowances in the EU ETS, for instance, is far 
from being an EU ETS testbeding as it is far from representing the institution chosen 
and so cannot be said to test its performance. Therefore, the first contribution we can 
identify from the present paper is the construction of an experimental design that 
includes as many characteristics as possible from the EU ETS. Our laboratorial market 
was characterized by imperfect competition (agents with different dimensions, different 
marginal abatement costs and different environmental targets) under a cap-and-trade 
system, with banking allowed, a secondary market represented by a double auction with 
discriminative prices and a penalty structure for incompliance2 similar to the 
2003/87/EC Directive. 
To examine the impact of the initial allocation rule – our experimental variable – we 
considered, for the case of an initial auction, the Ausubel (2004) model, an efficient 
                                                            
2 That in our experimental design could result from  random fluctuations on effective abatement. 
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dynamic design for multiple units with results equivalent to the Vickrey auction. 
Several types of auctions have been already experimentally tested for the initial 
allocation of emission permits3 but the present study is the first to implement this 
particular auction. From our experimental results we conclude that the Ausubel auction 
it is not an efficient initial allocation method for CO2 emission permits in the EU ETS 
but with the reallocation of permits in the secondary market total abatement cost 
minimization was achieved. And, even in the presence of an imperfectly competitive 
market, there is no statistically significant difference between efficiency of the 
laboratorial market we represented under different initial allocation rule (auctioning or 
grandfathering).  
A third innovation of this paper is the elicitation of subjects’ risk aversion preferences 
included in our experimental design. This is the first on EPM that explicitly classifies 
participants in the experiments on what concerns their attitudes towards risk, which 
allows us to test the hypothesis pointed in the literature about the relation between 
subjects’ banking behavior and their attitudes towards risk – and our experimental 
results could not confirm this theoretical hypothesis.      
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we describe our experimental 
design, including rules and parameters of our laboratorial market as well as the 
procedures followed in all experimental sessions; in Section 3 the hypothesis to be 
tested are presented; in Section 4 we analyze our experimental results; and finally, 
Section 5 concludes, summarizing our main findings. 
 
2. Experimental Design and Procedures 
In order to attain our goal we implemented computerized experimental sessions, using 
zTree software and all of them were constituted by three parts: 1) Socioeconomic 
questionnaire; 2) Multiple Price List (MPL); 3) an Emission Permits Market (EPM). 
The two first parts were included for control purposes and the last and central part of the 
experiment consisted of a laboratory representation of a specific emission permits 
                                                            
3 As it is the case of Holt et al. (2007) experimental study that tests five alternative auction rules – two 
static and three dynamic. 
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market – parallel to the EU ETS. If the first part, a socioeconomic questionnaire, it is 
usual procedure and raises no questions, the second part of our experiments, a Multiple 
Price List (as in figure 1) for elicitation of risk aversion attitudes (as in Holt and Laury 
(2002)), constitutes an innovative procedure on this kind of experiments.  
 
Fig.1 – zTree screen for the MPL used 
The objective was to classify our participants considering their attitudes towards risk 
and use these results for a better knowledge of our sample and, hopefully, a better 
understanding of agents’ strategies on the market (on the third part of the session), 
which was run under uncertainty about effective emission permits demand, due to 
random factors influencing effective abatement.  
Market agents do not have perfect information when deciding how to respect the 
environmental restriction they face and minimizing costs, on the third part of our 
experimental sessions. This characteristic was included in order to give us a more 
realistic environment because, in fact, there are many reasons why this may happen – 
measurement errors, unpredicted factors that influence the availability of resources like 
energy or different kind of fuels, which represents, at the end, more or less pollution 
than planned at first. 
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Uncertainty in our EPM was introduced according to Godby et al. (1997) procedure: a 
random variation on emissions was drawn from a uniform distribution (-1, 0, +1). And, 
to assure comparability of results, we used the same uniform distribution for the 
different experimental sessions.  
Besides considering a market under uncertainty on demand, we implemented a cap-and-
trade system but with a more restrictive environmental target than the one fixed in the 
European Union to guarantee effective scarcity on emission permits (and to avoid the 
lack of liquidity on the market if the original target was kept). However, the amount of 
emission permits each of our eight participants received was proportional to the Burden 
Sharing Agreement (BSA), which consisted on dividing the burden of the EU 
commitment under the Kyoto Protocol unequally amongst member states.  
For the abatement cost structure of each participant we considered Eyckmans et al. 
(2000) estimation for the coefficients of the marginal abatement cost functions of 14 
countries of the EU-15. Among these we chose eight countries, including the most 
pollutant ones. Our participants’ dimension and marginal abatement cost structure - as 
in table 14 - intended to parallel that of the chosen EU-15 member-states. This means 
the laboratory market we represented had an imperfect competitive structure: 
participants with heterogeneous dimensions, marginal abatement costs and emission 
targets – under uncertainty context on the demand side, due to imperfect information 
about effective emission levels.  
On what concerns emission permits intertemporal validity, we allowed banking but not 
borrowing, as predicted in the 2003/87/EC Directive: non-used permits are still valuable 
for the following periods but participants are not allowed to use on the current period 
emission permits they know will be given for the next periods.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
4 Although participant representing Germany could only see a total of 28 units, 20 of them grandfathered, 
this participant real dimension was 38 units (with 30 grandfathered emission permits). This simplification 
was due to a technical difficulty of representing a table with 38 units on a zTree screen considering 
information from a subjects table.   
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Table 1 – Marginal abatement costs  
Units  Belgium (S1)  
Spain 
(S2)  
Germany 
(S3)  
Greece 
(S4)  
France 
(S5)  
Italy 
(S6)  
U.K. 
(S7)  
Netherlands 
 (S8) 
1   76    37    4 59 21 17    6  32
2   177    90    11 149 56 42    15  76
3   291    152    18 255 100 72    25  127
4   413    220    27 374 151 105    37  182
5   543    294    36 503 208 140    50  241
6   678    372    46   270 177    63  304
7     454    56   337 216    77  369
8     539    67   408 257    92  436
9     627    79   483 300    107  506
10     719    91   561 344    123    
11     813    103   643 389    140    
12     909    115   729 436    157    
13     1008    128   817 484    174    
14       142   908 533    192    
15       155   1002 583    210    
16       169   1099 634    228    
17       184   1199 686    247    
18       198   1301 739    266    
19       213     792    286    
20       228     847    306    
21       243         326    
22       259         346    
23       274         367    
24       290         388    
25       307               409     
26       323               431    
27       340                   
28       356                   
Note: Units covered by grandfathered emission permits are signaled in bold – correspond to avoided abatement costs 
before banking or going to the market. Its sum equals 88 and corresponds to (fixed) supply of permits in each period. 
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For the secondary market a double auction with discriminative prices was implemented 
(reflecting rules of exchanges), which means participants pay what they bid or receive 
what they offer/accept in the market. Additionally, only profitable transactions were 
allowed and subjects had to respect the improvement rule while making their bids/asks 
in the market. Further, no re-sale was possible in the market (once bought, emission 
permits had to be used to avoid abatement costs).  
Each subject knew only their own marginal abatement costs and maximum permits 
needed. However, each transaction made in the market was publicly known (although 
the seller/buyer identification was not available). This market closed when time limit 
was reached (3 minutes) or all participants press “OK to next stage” button on the zTree 
screen. Information about random fluctuations on emissions appeared on the next screen 
and after that subjects were given the possibility to participate again in the market or 
change their banking decisions, to try to balance their positions.  
A penalty for incompliance was introduced, similar to the 2003/87/EC Directive, as 
well as the other institutional rules referred for our laboratorial market. Besides a 
monetary penalty, about four times the emission permits equilibrium price, subjects 
were obliged to deliver one emission permit more on the period after being incompliant. 
Initial allocation of permits was our experimental variable so we implemented one 
experimental treatment with grandfathering – as the 2003/87/EC Directive – and 
another with auctioning of 100% of emission permits available – following 
recommendations as in COM(2008) 16 final from 23.1.2008. For the auctioning 
treatment we were compelled to make a decision about its rules of functioning, as we 
were representing something that is not yet a reality for the EU ETS. Sealed-bid 
uniform price auctions are well known by utilities regulated in the EU ETS, have been 
used by Ireland, Hungary and Lithuania in the first phase of the EU ETS and Holt et al. 
(2007) recommend it to auction CO2 under the RGGI – Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative. However, for multiple units auctioning the literature consider this is not an 
efficient auction format, as it results in demand reduction (Ausubel e Cramton (1998); 
Holt (2006)). Although theoretically recognized its superiority for multiple units 
auctions, the second-price sealed bid format – the Vickrey auction – it is not usually 
implemented in practice due to its complexity. Ausubel (2004) has proven to have 
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found an equivalent dynamic version of Vickrey auction, much easier to implement and 
understand, therefore we considered we should implement its rules to auction CO2 
emission permits in our laboratorial market.  This is a dynamic auction, similar to the 
English one, with differences mainly on the rules used to determine the winning bids 
and the price paid for each unit bought. For each price asked by the auctioneer it is 
calculated the difference between total supply and residual demand, for each subject, 
and if it is positive participant receive that quantity, for the price proposed. This 
clinching rule was applied for each subject and each price proposed by the auctioneer, 
until total demand is equal or less than total supply (and the auction closed at this point).  
 
Table 2 – Summary of the different stages from the 3th part of the experimental design  
Stage 0:  Auction participation for acquisition of emission permits offered   
Possibility of making bids (quantities) for each  price proposed by the auctioneer. 
Stage 1:  Banking decision 
Subjects decide whether or not to use all the permits – i.e., decide to bank, or  not, some of  their 
permits. 
Stage 2: Permit market participation 
Possibility of buying/selling permits to other subjects. Emission permits for the current period, not 
banked on  the previous stage, can be sold at a price higher than the marginal abatement cost  and 
permits may be bought to cover units to abate, at a cost inferior to its marginal abatement cost. 
Stage 3: Information about random shock     .  
At this stage no decision has to be made. 
Participants are informed about non-predicted fluctuations on their emissions. It is announced the  
(-1, 0 ou +1) random fluctuation for the period and  its impact on subjects’ earnings. Information  
is given about possibilities available to reduce the negative impacts onearnings (or even make 
profits).  
Stage 4: Reconciliation market participation 
Only participants with  +1 or -1 at previous stage can  participate on this market and they are 
allowed to buy/sell the unit correspondent to the random fluctuation. 
No restrictions are imposed  to transaction  prices, which means transactions at a loss are possible 
on this market. 
Stage 5: Re-banking.  
Participants with a surplus permit, not sold at the reconciliation market, are given a chance, on this 
stage, to save it for future use. 
Participants with permit deficit that were not able to buy it at the previous stage are given a chance 
to use an emission permit previously banked. Obviously, this stage only opens if participants had 
previously banked at least one permit. If that is not the case, even if the participant is not able to 
buy the permit on the reconciliation market, he pays the penalty and goes immediately to the  next 
period, after stage 4, where he receives one permit less. 5 
                                                            
5 On the auction treatment, if the participant does not buy any permit in the auction, on the period after 
being incompliant, an extra unit must be abated, at a higher cost than all the others. 
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A private value, incomplete information version of the Ausubel (2004) auction was 
implemented. This means subjects knew only their own marginal abatement costs and 
while the auction was open they did not know anything about others demand not even 
the result for his own proposals. As long as the price in the auction increased subjects 
could conclude demand for permits was still higher than supply. 
Although experimental studies exist on the performance of this particular auction,6 the 
present paper is the first to do it for the case of CO2 emission permits, including 
characteristics as banking, a secondary market and uncertainty on demand. 
After auction closed and emission permits were allocated among participants, subjects 
were asked to make their banking decision. For the grandfathering treatment this stage 
was the first as emission permits initial allocation was already made and it was fixed 
during the session. As we summarize on table 2, the different stages included in the 
third part of our sessions – the EPM - were sequential, and repeated 10 times in each 
experimental session. Previously to this 10 period real market subjects participated in a 
5 period training period,7 not considered for payment effects as its goal was to introduce 
subjects to the environment where decisions had to be made and to assure all the rules 
were understood. 
Our laboratorial market was described using a neutral language on instructions. 
Emission permits, environmental goals or policy instruments for regulation were never 
mentioned. Subjects were told that an homogeneous good was produced at different 
scales and costs and could be traded in a market, with the rules presented. Although 
some experimental studies do otherwise, this is the most usual procedure in laboratory 
experiments on EPM. To avoid moral or ethical personal judgments to influence 
subjects’ actions was the main reason for our choice on neutral language. To evaluate 
the institution represented, the rules chosen, to analyze if it works, if the incentives are 
the correct ones: this is our goal, not to know if participants agree or not with those 
rules. 
                                                            
6 Kagel and Levin (2001), Engelmann and Grimm (2004) and Manelli et al. (2006), for instance. 
7 Three of this periods consisted of an accompanied and programmed training (all participants saw the 
same screens while experimenters were reading the instructions and giving the examples) with values 
different from the ones participants would face on the “real” experiment. On the other two periods 
subjects faced their own real values and took decisions on their own, interacting with each other. 
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For the two treatments – grandfathering and auctioning - we run 4 experimental sessions 
each,  8 with eight participants.  9 Subjects (non-experienced) were recruited in Minho 
University (Braga, Portugal) and consisted mainly on Management and Economics 
students. A 5€ participation fee was announced to be paid for the participation in 2h30m 
or 3h sessions (grandfathering or auctioning treatment, respectively) and the possibility 
of additional earnings depending on their decisions and some luck. Our experimental 
sessions lasted about the time we predicted and subjects earned on average 15.83€ and 
22.15€ in the grandfathering and auctioning treatment, respectively.  
 
3. Hypotheses 
Our investigation hypotheses considered, especially, previous empirical and experimental 
results on EPM institutions but also tried to test validity of some theories when not all 
their underlying hypotheses are respected or if applied under different contexts.   
Hypothesis 1: Total abatement cost minimization is possible with an EPM, similar to the 
EU ETS, when grandfathering is the initial allocation rule.  
The laboratorial market represented had an imperfectly competitive structure as well as 
banking and a reconciliation market, not included in Montgomery (1972) original model. 
Therefore, with the experimental results from these sessions with grandfathering, a test 
could be made about the possibility of reaching a competitive equilibrium even if the 
market it is not a perfectly competitive one. 
 For the auctioning treatment we intended to test two hypotheses. Firstly, we wanted to 
evaluate the performance of the Ausubel (2004) auction for the initial allocation of 
emission permits. Experimentally testing this auction format in such an environment is 
done for the first time in this paper. Secondly, to determine the efficiency of the EPM 
institution, as a whole, when auctioning is the chosen allocation rule. 
                                                            
8 In November 2008 for the grandfathering treatment (sessions 1-4) and  in May 2009 for the auctioning 
treatment (sessions 5-8). 
9 Besides two pilot sessions, one for each treatment. Although the results from these sessions are not 
analyzed, they played a crucial role on the success of our experiments. With these sessions we were able 
to identify code bugs and problems with the instructions that were not possible otherwise.  
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Hypothesis 2: When included in an EPM as the one we represented, the Ausubel (2004) 
auction efficiently allocates emission permits – giving them to the subjects with the 
highest marginal abatement costs. 
Hypothesis 3: Total abatement cost minimization is possible with an EPM, similar to the 
EU ETS, except for the initial allocation rule – 100% auctioning instead of 
grandfathering.  
From hypotheses 1 and 3, we test also the Montgomery’s original prediction about 
indifference of initial allocation rule for the final results of EPM’s. That is to say that 
efficiency achieved with grandfathering should not be different from that obtained when 
emission permits are initially auctioned. 
 Hypothesis 4: Total abatement cost within our laboratorial EPM is equal for the 
grandfathering and auctioning treatments. 
Even if hypothesis 4 is true, minimization of total abatement cost is achieved with a 
different number of transactions and prices on EPM, considering the initial allocation rule 
for emission permits: 
Hypothesis 5: In the auctioning treatment equilibrium quantities in EPM are inferior to 
the grandfathering treatment but equilibrium prices are superior.  
With an efficient auction for the initial allocation of emission permits, no transactions 
would occur in the EPM if banking or uncertainty (and the penalty associated) did not 
characterize our environment. As these characteristics were included, even with an 
efficient auction some transactions are necessary in the EPM to guarantee total abatement 
minimization costs.  Two different reasons might explain the existence of profitable 
transactions after an efficient auction. Banking of permits won at the auction is one 
reason and the other is the penalty application, which consists on retaining one of the 
permits achieved at the market if on the period before the subject had a permit deficit. 
With the uncertainty matrix used in all our experiments in some periods a shortage of 
permits existed due to random fluctuations, which meant that, if no banking was 
previously made, subjects would be incompliant.  
According to literature, subjects’ attitudes towards risk would influence their banking 
decisions so as to avoid incompliance penalties included in our design: subjects’ 
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maximizing behavior would depend on their attitude towards risk. As signaled by Godby 
et al. (1997), for neutral and risk adverse subjects banking of one unit along the whole 
session it is a maximizing behavior. In this case, a precautionary strategy should be 
adopted to avoid losses due to random fluctuations and consequent penalties. Only risk 
lover subjects should decide to use all the permits they possess for the current period. 
Considering these two maximizing behavior possibilities we determined, as Godby et al. 
(1997), two different benchmarks: a Market Equilibrium Benchmark, when retention 
(banking) of one permit was made along the session and a System Optimum Benchmark, 
considering the use of all permits available in each period. As supply and demand 
conditions are not the same on the 10 periods of the session10 these two benchmarks were 
calculated for each one of the periods.  
The Multiple Price List (MPL) our participants faced before starting our third part of the 
session (the EPM) allowed us to test, for the first time, this hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: When included in an EPM as the one we represented – with uncertainty on 
abatement and penalties on incompliance -, neutral or risk adverse subjects bank one 
permit during the whole session. 
Risk lover subjects’, on the contrary, are expected to use all the permits they have on the 
current period to maximize their earnings. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Banking Behavior 
Results from our MPL allowed us to conclude that participants in our experimental 
sessions were mainly risk neutral/adverse subjects (95%). Only 3 out of 64 subjects were 
classified as risk lovers therefore we would expect banking of one permit during the 
complete session from 61 participants (Hypothesis 6). Our results, however, did not 
confirm this hypothesis (z=-4.095, p=0.0000) – although banking is statistically different 
from one, on average, neutral/risk averse subjects bank 0.65 permits per period.  
                                                            
10    Although marginal abatement costs and participants’ dimensions are fixed, as well as the units 
grandfathered or auctioned each period  (88) , supply and demand change along the session because of 
random fluctuations, penalties application and banking decisions. 
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Although a great difference exists between the number of participants classified as risk 
lovers or risk neutral/averse in our sessions, our data is, nevertheless, very important as it 
allow us to experimentally test this theoretical hypothesis for the first time. 
Result 1: No statistically significant differences exist between risk lovers and risk 
neutral/adverse banking behavior.11  
However, when comparing banking behavior in our two experimental treatments we 
found there was a statistically significant difference (z=-2.465, p=0.0137): 
Result 2: Banking is higher when auctioning is the rule for initial allocation of emission 
permits.  
This result cannot be explained by different attitudes towards risk from participants in 
both treatments as they are very similar (1 risk lover in the grandfathering treatment and 2 
in the auctioning treatment). Inclusion of a MPL in our experimental design allows us to 
exclude that possibility. 
A higher degree of uncertainty exists on the auctioning treatment about the number of 
permits each subject will possess to cover their emissions. Although supply of permits is 
known and fixed in each period, participants do not know how many will be able to buy 
in the auction as it does not depend only on their own behavior but also on residual 
demand. To save some permits for the next period to face the uncertainty about the result 
of next period’s auction could be an explanation for the higher number of permits saved 
on the auctioning treatment, in comparison with the grandfathering one – a precautionary 
strategy to avoid penalties. However, the subject who banked the most in the auctioning 
treatment (Subject 5 from session 5) is risk lover, which means our potential justification 
for these results is not valid. If some strategy is to be identified with the observed banking 
behavior that would be speculation and not precaution, which, once again, highlights the 
importance of having introduced our MPL. Further data and investigation are necessary 
to explain this relation between emissions permits initial allocation rules and banking 
behavior. 
 
                                                            
11 As we can conclude from Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (z=0.289,  p=0.7728) test result. 
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4.2 – Auctioning Treatment 
Recurrent overbanking from the same subject in one of the auctioning experimental 
session turned the implemented auction inefficient in four out of 10 periods. Demand 
reduction registered in those periods resulted from the decision to use the emission 
permits excessively banked.12 In consequence, total auction demand was less than supply, 
meaning not all available permits were allocated.13 This means the environmental target 
achieved in this session was more restrictive than the one originally imposed, justifying 
the increase in total abatement costs in comparison to a command-and-control policy (for 
the original abatement target).  
However, even if we exclude session 5 from the analysis of the Ausubel auction results, 
we conclude emission permits allocation was not the most efficient. Total abatement cost 
achieved immediately after closing auction was statistically different (higher) from our 
benchmarks (z=2.803 e p=0.0051). 
Result 3: When implemented under the particular conditions of our laboratory 
environment, the Ausubel (2004) auction does not produce the sincere proposals and 
efficient results predicted by its author. No support was found to our hypothesis 2. 
The auction format experimentally tested revealed sensitive to the additional 
characteristics of our laboratorial institution (possibility of banking, secondary market, 
uncertainty on demand and penalty structure). As we can see from figure 2, abatement 
costs were about 111%, 12%, 7% and 32% higher than potential costs for sessions 5, 6, 7 
and 8, respectively, which indicates an inefficient emission permits allocation. 
Participants S1 (Belgium) and S4 (Greece) receive less units than would be optimal while 
participants S3 (Germany) and United Kingdom (S7), with bigger dimension and reduced 
marginal abatement costs, receive more CO2 emission permits than would be efficient. 
Except for S5 (France) and S6 (Italy) a 5% statistically significant difference is found 
between the amount of permits allocated to the subjects and our theoretical predictions. 
                                                            
12 On period 5 from session 5, for instance, the participant responsible for this excessive banking did not 
buy any emission permit on the auction, when he was supposed to achieve 15 permits at the end of an 
efficient auction. 
13 Auction average quantity was less than 88, as we can see from table 3, because of this session. If 
session 5 is excluded from our data, this quantity is exactly 88. 
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Fig.2 – Ratio between abatement costs after closing auction, in each session, and potential 
abatement costs for System Optimum and Market Equilibrium benchmarks   
 
Nevertheless, on average, the 4 experimental sessions run for the auctioning treatment 
achieved 90.1% and 91.4% of the potential auction revenue, for the System Optimum and 
Market Equilibrium benchmarks, respectively (as we can see from table 3). 
Participation in the secondary market, on the other hand, allowed emission permits to be 
correctly reallocated among those subjects who had higher marginal abatement costs. For 
that reason the average quantity of permits (profitably) transacted in the market was 
statistically significantly higher than predicted (considering an efficient auction). Not 
surprisingly, transaction prices in this market were inferior to our benchmarks, as we can 
see in table 4, although those differences are not statistically significant, with 95% 
confidence (z=-1.859, p=0.0630 and z=-0.280, p=0.7794, for System Optimum and 
Market Equilibrium benchmarks, respectively). In fact, an inefficient result from the 
auction creates potential gains from transactions inexistent otherwise14 and that explains 
figure 3.  
                                                            
14 That is why the highest number of transactions in the secondary market happens in session 5, the one 
with worse results for the auction. 
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Average market total surplus (consumer surplus + producer surplus) represented on 
figure 3, is statistically different from our System Optimum and Market Equilibrium 
benchmarks (z=2.366, p=0.0180 and z=2.521, p=0.0117, respectively), either we consider 
session 5 or not. If an efficient result for the auction had been attained in our experiments 
these market surplus would be impossible. But with an inefficient allocation of permits, 
the secondary market played a crucial role and offered much higher potential gains. 
 
Fig.3 – Average Total surplus in the secondary market and benchmarks, in the 
auctioning treatment 
Note: Average_TotalSurplus – Secondary market total surplus, determined as the average of sessions 5, 6, 
7 and 8 
TotalSurplus_Syst – Secondary market potential total surplus, without precautionary banking (System 
Optimum benchmark) 
TotalSurplus_Mkt - Secondary market potential total surplus, with precautionary banking (Market 
Equilibrium benchmark) 
 
An efficient permits’ allocation between participants is found, in the auctioning 
treatment, when we consider all market transactions (at the secondary and reconciliation 
market). This means total abatement costs achieved in our experimental sessions were 
close to our BTU (Banking & Trading & Uncertainty) competitive benchmark.15 
Efficiency indexes Isi and Imi determined for each period of session i quantify realized 
                                                            
15 We cannot reject the hypothesis of realized total abatement cost (average for the 4 sessions) being equal 
to our competitive benchmarks (z=1.172, p=0.2411 and z=1.682, p=0.0926 for System Optimum and 
Market Equilibrium, respectively). 
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potential gains of our laboratorial market institution, when all permits are used in each 
period or one emission permits is banked for precautionary reason, respectively. As we 
can see from table 5, session 6 and 7 register extremely positive results, with efficiency 
indexes above 90% for both benchmarks (reaching 99% and 100% for Market 
Equilibrium benchmark!). On the contrary, session 5 presents a negative result for these 
indexes, which means realized total abatement costs were superior to those of a 
Command-and-Control (CCU) environmental policy. However, CO2 emissions abatement 
achieved in session 5 is higher than our original target, used to determine CCU and BTU 
benchmarks. Therefore, if we exclude this session and consider only those that exactly 
achieved our original environmental target we find an average efficiency index for the 
EPM represented, with initial auction, of 84% and 96% for System Optimum and Market 
Equilibrium benchmarks, respectively. 
 
Table 5 – Efficiency indexes for the auctioning treatment sessions 
Period 
Session 5  Session 6 Session 7 Session 8  TOTAL TOT_ses5 
Is5 Im5  Is6 Im6 Is7 Im7 Is8 Im8  Is Im Is Im 
1 -8.74 -3.16  -0.89 1.14 -0.50 1.36 -3.35 -0.21  -3.37 -0.22 -1.58 0.76 
2 -2.42 -2.42  1.24 1.24 0.78 0.78 1.02 1.02  0.16 0.16 1.02 1.02 
3 -0.23 -0.23  0.56 0.56 0.99 0.99 1.31 1.31  0.66 0.66 0.95 0.95 
4 1.19 1.19  1.10 1.10 0.86 0.86 0.81 0.81  0.99 0.99 0.92 0.92 
5 1.73 1.73  1.28 1.28 1.12 1.12 1.45 1.45  1.40 1.40 1.28 1.28 
6 -1.87 -1.87  1.21 1.21 0.57 0.57 0.92 0.92  0.21 0.21 0.90 0.90 
7 -0.72 -0.72  0.75 0.75 1.01 1.01 0.56 0.56  0.40 0.40 0.77 0.77 
8 1.74 1.74  0.63 0.63 1.02 1.02 1.12 1.12  1.13 1.13 0.93 0.93 
9 -0.91 -0.91  0.85 0.85 1.28 1.28 1.02 1.02  0.56 0.56 1.05 1.05 
10 3.01 1.66  2.34 1.15 2.10 0.97 1.99 0.88  2.36 1.17 2.14 1.00 
Average -0.72 -0.30  0.91 0.99 0.92 1.00 0.68 0.89  0.45 0.64 0.84 0.96 
 
Note: 
)(
)(
SS
iS
i BTUCCU
AbatCostCCUIs −
−=  ; 
)(
)(Im
mm
im
i BTUCCU
AbatCostCCU
−
−=  ,  i = 5, 6, 7, 8 
  
We can summarize our results, illustrated on table 5, for sessions 6, 7 and 8 as follows: 
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Result 4: Even under imperfect competition, the EPM represented in the laboratory, with 
100% auctioning for initial allocation of permits, is functional and allows substantial 
abatement cost reductions, comparatively to a CCU policy. Therefore, we confirm our 
hypothesis 3. 
Considering data from our session 5 we can summarize an observed result although not 
originally predicted: 
Result 5: An EPM as the one we represented, with an auction for emission permits initial 
allocation, guarantees at least the environmental target is achieved but emissions 
reductions can even be superior. Therefore, the environmental target becomes 
endogenous.   
This result is a consequence of considering an EPM where banking is allowed and 
simultaneously auction is the initial allocation rule. Overbanking it is not a surprising 
behavior (identified by Gangadharan et al. (2005), for instance) but when registered in an 
EPM with initial auction turns the environmental result not totally controllable by the 
regulator. This may, or not, be a serious consequence, depending on the level of accuracy 
of the original environmental target, determined by the regulator. Further investigation is 
needed in this area to verify the importance of eventual social losses involved. 
4.3 – Grandfathering Treatment 
 Emission permits allocation, at the beginning of each period, was fixed and known to all 
subjects on the grandfathering treatment. Potential gains from trade existed and these 
were mostly achieved in our experimental sessions. As we can see from table 6, the 
number of profitable transactions realized was less than potential and the average 
equilibrium price in the secondary market was, on the contrary, superior to our 
benchmarks. However, realized secondary market surplus (consumer surplus + producer 
surplus) was not statistically different from the potential one (t=-0.9141 and t=0.1897 for 
the System Optimum and Market Equilibrium, respectively). These tests confirm the 
picture we have from the analysis of figure 4, where market surplus seem to closely 
follow our theoretical predictions. However, sellers realized, on average, more than the 
potential gains while buyers’ surplus, on the other hand, was generally bellow our 
benchmarks.  
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Fig.4 – Average Total surplus in the secondary market and benchmarks, in the 
grandfathering treatment 
 
After transactions in the secondary market, emission permits allocation between subjects 
it is not statistically significantly different from our theoretical prediction for a 
competitive market, except for those participants representing Spain (S2) and Germany 
(S3). This means our laboratorial institution was able to allocate permits to those subjects 
who faced higher marginal abatement costs. As this is the ultimate goal of this policy 
instrument, our experimental results are a good sign about efficiency of the institution 
chosen for the EU ETS (that our experimental design tries to parallel).  
In fact, after considering transactions in the reconciliation market and re-banking 
decisions, in consequence of random fluctuations on emissions, realized total abatement 
costs in each grandfathering treatment session closely followed our benchmarks. No 
statistically significant differences are found between total abatement costs observed and 
our two theoretical references for a competitive market (z=0.866, p=0.3863 and z=0.968, 
p=0.3329 for System Optimum – BTUs - and Market equilibrium – BTUm - benchmarks, 
respectively). This explains the high level of efficiency of each session for this treatment, 
illustrated by efficiency indexes of table 7. 
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Table 7 - Efficiency indexes for the grandfathering treatment sessions 
Period 
Session 1  Session 2 Session 3 Session 4  TOTAL 
Is1 Im1  Is2 Im2 Is3 Im3 Is4 Im4  Is Im 
1 -0.62 1.29  -0.34 1.44 -1.75 0.67 0.00 1.63  -0.68 1.26 
2 0.78 0.78  1.22 1.22 0.87 0.87 0.99 0.99  0.97 0.97 
3 1.03 1.03  0.41 0.41 0.93 0.93 0.34 0.34  0.68 0.68 
4 0.68 0.68  0.60 0.60 0.55 0.55 1.24 1.24  0.77 0.77 
5 1.04 1.04  1.21 1.21 1.06 1.06 0.90 0.90  1.05 1.05 
6 1.05 1.05  1.01 1.01 1.38 1.38 0.61 0.61  1.01 1.01 
7 1.04 1.04  0.66 0.66 0.96 0.96 0.40 0.40  0.77 0.77 
8 1.1 1.1  1.20 1.20 0.90 0.90 1.12 1.12  1.08 1.08 
9 0.95 0.95  1.12 1.12 1.15 1.15 0.72 0.72  0.99 0.99 
10 2.00 0.89  1.50 0.52 1.77 0.72 2.54 1.30  1.95 0.86 
Average 0.91 0.99  0.86 0.94 0.78 0.92 0.89 0.93  0.86 0.95 
 
Note: 
)(
)(
SS
iS
i BTUCCU
AbatCostCCUIs −
−=  ; 
)(
)(Im
mm
im
i BTUCCU
AbatCostCCU
−
−=  ,  i = 1, 2, 3, 4 
 
On average, the four grandfathering sessions register an 86% efficiency index, when 
calculated for the System Optimum benchmark, and a 95% efficiency index for the 
Market Equilibrium reference. These values lead us to the following result: 
Result 6: Even under imperfect competition, the EPM represented in the laboratory, with 
grandfathering as the rule for initial allocation of permits, is functional and allows 
substantial abatement cost reductions, comparatively to a CCU policy. Therefore, we 
confirm our hypothesis 1. 
Rules implemented in our laboratorial market for the transaction of CO2 emission 
permits, grandfathered to the subjects at the beginning of each period of the session, give 
the right incentives for an optimal reallocation of emission permits. This suggests the 
same result could be attained inside the EU ETS. 
4.4 –Initial allocation rule impact 
Sessions 1 to 4 and 5 to 8 were run for a similar experimental design except for one 
variable: emission permits initial allocation rule. All the rest, including participants 
25 
 
attributes, rules for transaction in the markets, the uncertainty matrix16 and penalty 
scheme, is exactly the same in the eight experimental sessions run. On tables 5 and 7 we 
presented efficiency indexes achieved on those sessions. Except for session 5, for the 
reason explained above, those efficiency indexes indicate most of the potential gains 
predicted for a competitive EPM with the rules specified on Section 2 were realized. 
When using the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test to verify if those indexes were different 
for the grandfathering and auctioning sessions we concluded no statistically significant 
difference exists (z=0.145, p=0.8845 for both benchmarks, even when the outlier is 
included). This leads us to the next result: 
Result 7: Total abatement costs and efficiency indexes, for an EPM as the one we 
represented, are the same, whether emission permits are initially grandfathered or 
auctioned. These results confirm Montgomery’s theoretical predictions, even if our 
laboratorial EPM does not respect his entire underlying hypothesis. Therefore, we found 
evidence in favor of our hypothesis 4. 
Although the final result is approximately the same in both treatments, this was 
consequence from different banking behavior or transactions in the market. On what 
concerns to banking, as we said above, further investigation is needed to evaluate the 
evidence for higher amounts of banking in the auctioning treatment.  
On the secondary market, we expected to register different equilibrium price and 
quantities, as it is clear from the benchmark values on tables 4 and 6. Traded quantities 
were, in fact, superior in the grandfathering than in the auctioning treatment (z=3.485, 
p=0.0005), as theoretically expected. However, our experimental results did not confirm 
the existence of higher prices in the auctioning treatment as we predicted (t=1.3832, 
p=0.1835). 
 Result 8: Equilibrium quantities in the secondary market are higher in the 
grandfathering treatment, which supports our hypothesis 5. However, data from 
equilibrium prices in both treatments it is not statistically different, contradicting the 
same hypothesis. 
                                                            
16 Reflecting the random fluctuations on emissions from a  (-1, 0, +1) uniform distribution. 
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Potential gains in the secondary market were expected to be higher in the grandfathering 
than in the auctioning treatment. However, total surplus in both treatments was not 
statistically different (z=-0.302, p=0.7624) and the same happened with consumer surplus 
(z=-0.302, p= 0.7624). Only producer surplus is statistically different in both treatments, 
as we confirm with 99% confidence our theoretical predictions of higher surplus in the 
grandfathering treatment (z=3.628, p=0.0003). This means total surplus in the market for 
the auctioning treatment were higher than predicted because buyers realized gains higher 
than expected. 
For the reconciliation market we found no statistically significant differences between 
prices and quantity transacted, in the two experimental treatments. This result is greatly 
imposed by our rules for the market, particularly on what concerns quantities. It would 
not be possible great differences because there was a limit on the number of units that 
could be traded on the reconciliation market (determined by the random fluctuation 
resultant from the uncertainty matrix we used).  
5. Conclusion 
The functioning of a carbon emission permits markets, similar to the EU ETS, with 
effective abatement uncertainty and several other real world implementation 
characteristics was analyzed in this paper. Our focus on the EU ETS and its institutional 
characteristics is justified by the fact of being one of the biggest environmental policy 
experiments ever. Its dimension, multi- jurisdictional political structure, connection 
between differing domestic emissions permits programs and innovative character on 
dealing with greenhouse gases emissions on a big scale justify its status. According to the 
World Bank Report by Capoor and Ambrosi (2008), in 2007 the EU ETS was still the 
major carbon market, by far, both on volume and value. Therefore, enormous attention is 
currently placed on its performance and developments by those who plan to implement a 
similar policy. 
Experimental methodology was used to pursue our goal. As pointed by Smith (1982), it is 
not possible to design a laboratory experiment about resources allocation without 
rigorously defining all the institutional rules and details. Although not formalized at the 
theoretical model describing emission permits markets these are characteristics that 
matter for its final results.  
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Our experimental design intended to include as many EU ETS characteristics as possible 
without rendering the experiment too complex. Emission permits initial allocation rule 
was our experimental variable and we concluded it has no influence on the efficiency of 
the institution represented. Total abatement cost minimization was achieved in both 
grandfathering and auctioning treatment. Even with an inefficient allocation of permits 
rendered by the Ausubel (2004) auction, the secondary market was capable to correctly 
allocate them at the end. Therefore, our results contribute to the ongoing discussion of 
proposals in favor of the use of auctions as a rule for the initial allocation method for CO2 
emission permits.  
However, some differences were signaled in the data collected from sessions of the two 
treatments. As predicted, fewer transactions are necessary in the secondary market when 
emission permits are initially auctioned. If transaction costs exist (a characteristic not 
included in our experimental design), we can say the auctioning option is superior to the 
grandfathering one. 
Banking was higher in the auctioning treatment. This is a result we did not predict and 
cannot explain but with identifiable consequences: the environmental target becomes 
endogenous and not exogenous (as it is guaranteed in the grandfathering treatment). A 
higher level of emissions abatement than the one initially fixed is possible. This 
connection between banking and auction needs further investigation. Social losses in 
consequence of this behaviour depend on the accuracy of the environmental target 
originally imposed by the regulator.  
Banking was, in fact, the rule that contributed the less for the efficiency of our EPM. As 
it is part of any EPM implemented and theoretically recommended as a solution for many 
market failures, this is a troubling finding. In our experimental design risk neutral/ averse 
subjects were expected to bank one permit during the whole session. Comparing the 
classification from the MPL introduced in the beginning of our sessions and banking 
subjects behaviour we did not find support to that hypothesis. This makes us question 
whether the adequate incentives were not given, or cognitive limitations or task 
complexity were the reason for this suboptimal use of banking.  
Reality is much more complex than our experimental environment, and several EU ETS 
characteristics were not included in or experimental design (as the use of options and 
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futures, for instance). However, the high level of efficiency achieved in our experimental 
EPM, which parallels the EU ETS in many aspects, make us believe our institutional 
“details” could also be relevant for the success of the European carbon. A more restrictive 
environmental target for the grandfathering treatment was crucial for our results. And this 
is something the European Commission already tried to assure when approving the 
National Allocation Plans for the second phase of the market (2008-2012). On the other 
hand, restrictions on transactions, as the impossibility of re-sale, are important “details” 
from our design as largely influence our final results. Instead of being pointed as 
limitations of our experiments, because they differ from the EU ETS, we believe them to 
be good policy indications. Regulation in this market is essential to assure the targets are 
achieved and transactions in the market are not used but to help companies minimize 
their abatement costs.   
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